Is There a Text in This Grass? by Hollis, C. Carroll
Volume 3 Number 3 ( 1986) pps. 15-22 
Is There a Text in This Grass? 
C. Carroll Hollis 
ISSN 0737-0679 (Print) 
ISSN 2153-3695 (Online) 
Copyright © 1986 C. Carroll Hollis 
Recommended Citation 
Hollis, C. C. "Is There a Text in This Grass?." Walt Whitman Quarterly Review 3 (12 1986), 15-22. 
https://doi.org/10.13008/2153-3695.1858 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Walt Whitman Quarterly Review by an authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For more information, 
please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu. 
IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS GRASS? 
C. CARROLL HOLLIS 
MARK BAUERLEIN'S ARTICLE concerns the recent emphasis on "orality" in 
Whitman's poetry, specifically in "Song ' of Myself," as treated by three 
critics, Calvin Bedient, John Irwin, and myself. WWQR's editors have asked 
me for a comment, but I do not feel comfortable in speaking of or for Bedient 
or Irwin. However, the last third of the article does concern the third chapter 
of a book of mine. To that I want to respond, for it bears on the larger and on-
going debate on mediation in poetry. But first let me point out how "Speech 
Acts and Leaves of Grass" came about. 
I had been teaching Whitman for many years and had long felt that no 
one had quite explained what characterized his writing. In the late 1970s I 
had lots of free time, so began what might be called a pragmatic stylistic 
analysis of Leaves. I was looking for recurring patterns, ways of writing that 
could be checked as "style markers" - thus negation, journalistic language, 
the "cursus," metonymy, and one I'm no·w working on, deixis. But I didn't 
even know what a speech act was until two years after I had already gathered 
some few hundred specimens of "modes of speaking" that I didn't know how 
to categorize. 
Indeed this particular group might have remained just that until I hit on 
the Speech Act concept, which gave me a way of classifying and commenting 
on that mass of quotations collected under the awkward label of ADDRESS. 
Perhaps in my satisfaction and relief at finding how to handle that particular 
file, my account may sound more triumphant than need be. But it wasn't a 
question of whether Whitman should or could be using "Speech Acts." The 
fact was that they were there, and all I wanted to do was to classify them and 
work out the implications on his style. Bauerlein thinks I "openly revere" 
Whitman's illocutionary poetry, something of an overstatement. I'm not 
much on reverence of any sort and think Whitman much more of a shrewd, 
crafty rhetorician than do most of my colleagues. 
As I tried to show in those two chapters preceding my Speech Act treat-
ment, Whitman wanted to be a public speaker. True, he never became one, 
but a helpful way of getting a handle on the style of many of the early poems 
(the "platform poems") is to approach them as speeches. Mter finishing the 
book, I had a lucky break in discovering more support for my hunch that 
these platform poems were meant to be spoken. It was written up in the ar-
ticle Bauerlein lists in note #6, and it considers the "rhetorical dots" and "oro-
tund voice" of the first edition. I assume he accepts the speech origins of these 
early poems, since he doesn't say otherwise, but he objects to the implication 
that the printing of a speech carries any of the illocutionary force of the 
original. 
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That part of his essay which is specifically directed to me begins with 
four quotations, two from "Song of Myself' and two from Emerson's "The 
Poet." These passages are certainly appropriate to a discussion of poetry but 
do not have much bearing on speech acts that I can see. There is, however, 
one reading on which I will digress a moment in order to offer a different ver-
sion. The first line quoted is one of those I quoted on p. 70 of my book as an 
example of an Assertive Speech Act, but here it is used literally as a statement 
of Whitman's stance. The line is in Section 47, line 1247: 
And I swear I will never translate myself at all, only to him or her 
who privately stays with me in the open air. 
The second quotation is from Section 48, 11. 1279-1280, but I provide a few 
previous lines to give the sense of the passage (with my italics for emphasis): 
And I call to mankind, Be not curious about God, (1. 1271) 
I hear and behold God in every object, yet I understand God not in the least, (1. 1274) 
I see something of God each hour of the twenty four, and each moment then, 
In the faces of men and women I see God, and in my own face in the glass; 
I find letters from God dropped in the street, and everyone is signed by God's name, 
And I leave them where they art; for I know that others will punctually come 
forever and ever. (11. 1277-1280) 
Now Bauerlein sees the "letters from God" as some sort of arcane knowledge 
available to Whitman (as prophet, I presume) which he will decipher 
("translate") for those who will join him "in the open air" (Le., turn away 
from schools, libraries, scripture, churches). But what the poet is saying in 
the passage providing the context for the "letters from God" is that we all 
waste too much time and spiritual energy searching for God, for something 
beyond life, instead of participating and enjoying life itself, where God is re-
vealed in everything we experience, low as well as high, common as well as 
rare, vulgar as well as refined. 
Now it is true that "letters from God" have never been explicated. In-
deed, in our motorized society, few readers have any idea what Whitman is 
talking about. But if we could join Whitman "in the open air," he would 
surely tell us they were "horse-droppings." I can "translate" this line from a 
range of experience that only a few older Whitman readers can still recall: the 
horse-drawn carriages and stage-coaches of Broadway and other by-ways of 
the poet's time and a few decades thereafter. Such "letters" were a fact of life, 
not pretty perhaps, but not necessarily repulsive either, known to all but 
never mentioned in the polite society of Victorian America - which, of 
course, is just why Whitman would make such a figure of speech. His horse-
bun theology was doubtless meant to be a shocker to the sanctimonious, and 
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it still makes for a rather surprising opening for a debate on Whitman's 
speech acts. 
At the end of Bauerlein's comment on the Whitman-Emerson passages, 
he asks: "How does the visionary prophet consecrate his language and accu-
mulate an assenting audience who credits his inspiration?" This is a con-
fusing question for we don't know whether it refers to a true prophet (say, a 
Biblical prophet) or a poet who wishes to sound like one (who would be re-
jected by the Emerson passages). But to set the record straight, the true 
prophet never tries to "consecrate his language" for God does that. Nor does 
he contrive to "accumulate an assenting audience" to credit his inspiration. I 
expand on this situation on pages 80-81 of my book, and I wish Bauerlein 
had indicated he understood my position. To make sure, let me pull another 
example from my anecdotage, this time about the nearest thing to a prophet 
I've ever encountered. 
Shortly after coming to Chapel Hill we were exploring the countryside 
one Saturday afternoon, came through a little town, spotted an open-air 
farmers' market, and stopped to get some apples. Twenty yards down the 
road a man in overalls was standing on the back of his pick-up shouting at the 
passers-by. At first I thought he was drunk or making sport, but soon heard 
something to the effect, "And you sinners think the Lord will forgive you, 
but when His wrath comes .... " I made some query to the farmer picking out 
my apples, and he told me the county prophet came in town on Saturdays 
and spoke his piece while his wife and sister were doing their shopping, that 
he went on until his voice wore down or his family came back, that he had 
never done anyone any harm, and (handing me the apples) that'll be a dollar 
and a half. My New England boyhood, plus college and teaching in the Mid-
west, had not prepared me for country prophets, and a few days later I was 
telling some colleagues about this pathetic little Flannery-Faulkner episode, 
how depressed the poor prophet must have felt with all his shouting and 
warning and nobody paying any attention. But a wiser colleague (and a 
native) interrupted, "Depressed? Not a bit ofit. Those people pretending not 
to hear him just prove his point - to him. They're all sinners and he and the 
Lord know it." It was a true eye-opener to me, and I think of it every time I 
hear Whitman called a prophet. That country prophet might have been a 
little far out from my secular point of view, but he wasn't adjusting his man-
ner to please me. Believing that the townpeople's scorn or my own tolerant 
pity was nothing more than the sin of pride inviting the divine wrath, he 
would be confirmed in his view by our pointed ignoring of his warning. 
Now, wacky or not, that country prophet had what all prophets have-
complete confidence and sincerity in their role. That characteristic inner con-
viction may also be found in William Blake and Christopher Smart, I think, 
but clearly not in Whitman. Although Walt admired the passionate direct-
ness and intensity of Elias Hicks and Rev. Edward Taylor (Melville's Father 
Mapple), he wanted to imitate their outward illocutionary style and not their 
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inward convictions. I find nothing in Whitman's life to indicate that he was a 
true prophet. But there is much, both in the workbooks and in the poetry, to 
show that he wanted to sound like one. 
Three-quarters of the way through his essay, Bauerlein summarizes my 
position on Speech Acts and Illocution. The summary is accurate, although I 
don't think I actually said that "What makes Whitman's language so effec-
tively oracular" is "its illocutionary force." Also, as an inveterate anti-royal-
ist, I had a lady senator, not the queen, christening that ship. But he does ex-
plain Austin's speech acts, summarizing information I had previously pre-
sented on pp. 66-74 of Language and Style. He points out (as I did on p. 76) 
Austin's rejection of illocution in literature, and also we both point out Oh-
mann's acknowledgment that there cannot be actual illocutionary force in 
literature but only mimetic. All this I had agreed with on pp. 76-78. In fact all 
the references Bauerlein uses I had already quoted (plus three more, includ-
ing that most important article of Samuel Levin), and I am curious why he 
didn't say so. By not saying so, he implies that I am not au courant on the key 
scholarship in this major area. Nevertheless, he finally does acknowledge that 
"with this qualification (illocutionary force as mimetic) speech act theory can 
be applied to literature and Hollis's implementation of it is justified." Since 
that is all I claimed in the first place, I've wondered why he is so alarmed. As I 
wrote in conclusion to my own summary of Austin, Ohmann, and the Speech 
Act controversy, my "only concern is with the persona's speech acts as a 
stylistic feature of the poetry" (p. 78). 
After agreeing that my use of the speech act theory is justified, Bauerlein 
then says, "But representing an illocutionary act brings about the mitigation 
of its original illocutionary force." Yes, of course! How could one not accept 
the inevitable, almost necessary mitigation? But to mitigate is to lessen, to 
moderate, to make milder-yet never to destroy or wipe out. I make this point 
emphatically here, for he continues on his final page to knock out ofliterature 
forever even that mimetic illocution he has earlier accepted. He now insists 
that illocutionary force exists only in a real and actual live situation in which 
a speaker confronts a qualified listener in a personal encounter: "Without a 
'real' natural context ... illocutionary force, in literature, becomes merely an 
empty, impotent abstraction." There are, then, no degrees of illocutionary 
force, no remaining mitigated force; it is 1000/0 or nothing. 
The problem as to illocutionary force after the original utterance is as old 
as the history of our civilization. The original utterance of the prophet is pre-
sumably a speech act of the highest sort since the words have the force "as 
from God." God spoke to Moses and Moses spoke to the Israelites-surely 
the utterance of the Ten Commandments was the pre-eminent Speech Act. 
But why, then, did God engrave them on stone? The complicated and end-
less argument about the efficacy of (and degrees thereof) of speech and/or 
script has been treated by Plato in Phaedrus and by many others all the way 
up to Derrida, with whom and after whom the argument has been intense. 
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It's great fun to argue, and Whitman (always hungering for attention of what-
ever sort) would certainly be delighted to be argued about. But at the prag-
matic level on which we all exist, in our literature classes as well as in our 
daily lives, we acknowledge the mediation and then forget it and go on about 
our teaching. 
Truly, can you imagine a re-orientation of our teaching of Whitman to 
insist that students understand the "empty, impotent abstraction" of his 
speech acts? We would take the first of the classes that our syllabus allots to 
Whitman to explain away for our students the speech acts in the opening 
lines of "Song of Myself': We would point out that Whitman doesn't cele-
brate himself because he is dead; we are reading his poem to illustrate how 
print often fools the everyday reader because of the elevated attention our 
culture gives to what we call poetry; the one thing we must all be careful not 
to assume is what he tells us we shall assume, for as the third line demon-
strates he is just trying to get our good will by that rhetorical device of assert-
ing our sharing in the created world. After explaining away all present tense, 
for writing itselfis always after the event, we triumphantly point to the ques-
tions at 11. 22-24: "Have you reckoned ... ? Have you practiced so long to 
learn to read? Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?" How 
empty these lines are, we smile, for we cannot hear him and he couldn't even 
know we existed. So, we say, we won't stop that day ~nd night with a long 
dead poet, and you can go back to your dorms, where you surely won't 
possess the origin of all poems (chuckle, chuckle). So we dismiss the class half 
an hour early, after wisely cautioning them against any "willing suspension 
of disbelief' that may be lingering around campus. And at the next class we 
quietly dismiss from our conscience those who have dropped the course, 
those bourgeois types who now decide ROTC is a better deal, and those 
others who have to take another English course, so take Business English in-
stead. 
But I have been carried away by my own rhetoric, and apologize. Still, 
there is a serious omission in Bauerlein's treatment that must be pointed out. 
We must remember that Austin started the speech act controversy, but he 
didn't finish it. Since his death the discussion of illocutionary acts has occa-
sioned a bibliography ofits own, with hundreds of articles, many books, and 
a continuing debate among those concerned. It was recognized early on that 
the rules Austin tentatively asserted as applying only to oral speech could 
also include many written acts. There is no argument or difference on the lit-
eral consequences of putting spoken language in written form. We all agree 
that the mediation involved inevitably brings about some change. But the 
milkman accepts the note I leave, just as he would respond if I were at the 
door, to tell him to deliver only "One quart today." The same principle ap-
plies to the Magna Carta at Runnymede, and one didn't have to be present to 
benefit from it, not did it make any difference whether it was spoken first or 
not. Austin himself inadvertently includes one such act, "I bequeath my 
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watch to my brother," which would normally be in a will or testament, not in 
speech. 
Proposals, promises, bequests, treaties, mortgages, copyrights, leases, 
games, contracts, expressions of grief, anger, love, joy, remorse, all such 
communications may share in the illocutionary act if the same conditions are 
present (the felicity conditions Austin speaks of), except there is a delay until 
both parties agree, by phone call, letter, witnessed document, and so on. The 
very vexing problem of "mortmain" (literally "dead hand," i.e., power be-
yond the grave) is endlessly argued in the courts, but it has a very real appli-
cation in and to literature that has not yet been adequately explored - for in-
stance, Whitman's right to change his poetry once it has been published. 
The written illocutionary act is not as dramatic as those Austin men-
tions, to be sure, but it is undeniably present. Whitman himself was well 
aware of the concomitant strengths and virtues of speech and script: speech 
dies even as it is uttered (so, no speech as speech is ever literature unless put 
in permanent form), and writing cannot but lose the values of voice, rhythm, 
tonal variations, gesture. I was checking back in some old Whitman notes of 
mine a few days ago for other purposes (to check the extent to which he knew 
about Platonic love) and found this note to himself: "In Phaedrus, Socrates is 
presented as making light of written discourse in comparison with the speech 
of the live and learned speaker." But then, two entries later, he resolves the 
problem as far as he is concerned by making up one of those self-reviews of 
his own work: 
Personality in Poetic Expression 
" ? Put in that 
No writer has so put personality into poetic expression, not 
at two or three removes, but direct face to face - the object of 
the writer seems to be from the first page to the last, to give whoever 
peruses him, the effects not of literary art but of vivid personal presence, dasp, voice, 
living eyes, clasp of hands. 
Unfortunately I didn't use this example in the book, but I do mention the 
problem at the bottom ofp. 75. However I didn't expand on it, for I was con-
cerned with the speech act. All of Whitman's speech acts that I was working 
on were written as if they were parts of an oral act. 
But now some questions to Bauerlein concerning his insistence that the 
rigid conditions he derives from Austin abolish illocutionary acts from litera-
ture. Let me start with Lincoln's Gettysburg Address. Did "illocutionary 
force proceed spontaneously out of [that] particular situation"? I presume so, 
but what of the father of one of those dead who was so far back he couldn't 
hear much of it, so he read it over and over again in the newspaper the next 
day? Did he find that reading "fictional and groundless"? And if there is no il-
locutionary force at all in the repetition of that Address each May 30th ever 
since, why do hundreds come to hear it? And if its illocutionary force 
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vanishes in print, why does it show up in edition after edition in American 
Literature anthologies? 
Again, Emerson's "Divinity School Address" and "American Scholar" 
and "Self Reliance" are all famous essays, but only the first was called an Ad-
dress. Yet that makes little difference in our treatment of them, for they were 
all first given orally. But if a student reads one of them now, would he be 
reading "an empty, impotent abstraction"? The "Divinity School Address" 
was written in late June or early July, 1838, and delivered on the 18th, and 
printed that autumn. Was there illocutionary force in the manuscript only 
when it was delivered? Suppose it hadn't been delivered or it was read by 
someone else because Emerson had a cold? And did that force disappear 
when it was printed? I think not, but rather the illocutionary force was 
mitigated (say from 1000/0 to 500/0) when it went into print. An inevitable 
price to pay, but well worth it, for it made the remaining illocutionary force 
permanent. It was that which made all the controversy, for in its permanent 
form it might now corrupt thousands of believers, not just the few dozen 
graduating seniors-so, at any rate, Andrews Norton must have thought. 
To say that the "illocutionary acts" of Emerson's lectures "lose their 
meaning in representation" is to mitigate them out of existence. Obviously 
there is some loss, but it is the kind and degree ofloss that should concern us, 
not whether there was any, for no one questions that. Let me approach this 
matter another way. I saw and heard Kennedy's inaugural by television. Was 
I then not part of "a specified appropriate audience" before whom the act was 
completed? If not, why were the television cameras there? Again, one of the 
assorted unlucky breaks in my career was that I didn't hear Allen Ginsberg's 
"Howl" at its original presentation. But when I heard about it, I tracked 
down a record of it, then read it, and later used to bring to class a tape of that 
portion that was in our anthology. I truly don't know what it would have 
been like to be at one of those early performances, but I do think I got more 
out of hearing the record and reading "Howl" than I would have got back at 
the bar, beered up or drowsy on grass, at an early oral presentation. Sure, I 
would have liked to have been there as witness to a notorious but great occa-
sion in American cultural history. But, and I ask this seriously, did my "ab-
sence" as "a specified, appropriate audience" forfend "Howl" as illocutionary, 
especially when I heard it once removed (i.e., by tape)? And here is a final 
question: would reading the manuscript of "Howl" before the event (as Fer-
linghetti must have done) negate its illocutionary force completely any more 
than reading a Whitman poem that never was delivered? 
To conclude with a mild coup de Grass: it is clear to me that Whitman 
wrote some of his early poems (the "platform poems") to give orally as well as 
to appear in print. In that later article, which Bauerlein knows, I show that 
the "rhetorical pauses" can have no other meaning except as guides to oral 
reading. It would seem, then, that the poet wrote to be heard as well as to be 
read. What I was up to in my book was to categorize what I found as one of 
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the stylistic features of that early poetry. Since many of them fitted Austin's 
neat categories, I called them "speech acts" and guessed that they came from 
Whitman's lost dream of being the prophetic orator of a Jacksonian America 
he wanted to revive. The article seems to back up the book, and I'm sorry 
Bauerlein didn't take it into consideration. Yet I am grateful to his article any-
way, for he made me re-think that chapter and think through the grades and 
degrees of mitigation which Whitman's never-uttered speech acts underwent 
by becoming poetry. And yes, Grass would be a text in my class - that is, if I 
taught any more - and one lecture would still be on speech acts. 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
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